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In Search of Adequate Compensation for Toxic
Waste Injuries: Who and How to Sue
That civil liability should arise from the wrongful dumping of toxic wastes
cannot be doubted. However, the various jurisdictions are far from uniform
as to what is the appropriate legal theory for recovery. This comment will ex-
plore the alternatives for imposition of civil liability and analyze the plain-
tiffs chances for recovery.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE POISONING OF AMERICA UNCOVERED
Hazardous waste production and dumping is now recognized to be a
grave national danger. Scholars have warned us that "the potential
dangers toxic wastes pose to the country's land, water, air, public
health, and economy are second only to the threat of nuclear war."1
Accompanying the marked increase in the number of victims'
claims against waste dumpers, mounting media attention to the in-
dustry's unsafe disposal methods,2 and the ever-increasing number of
additions to the Environmental Protection Agency's "national prior-
ity list" of dumps posing the most serious danger to public health,3
has been a recent increase in public awareness. This increase in con-
cern centers primarily on two important issues: first, how to prevent
future environmental and human injury; and second, how to compen-
sate victims of past unsafe waste dumping practices.
The purpose of this article is to suggest a method of resolving the
difficulties associated with compensating innocent third parties who
have become victims of hazardous waste exposure. The method in-
volves: first, identifying the source of the toxic waste exposure and
suing the owner of the property from which it has escaped; second,
proving that the injuries suffered were caused by the waste; and
third, determining who the producer of the waste was and imputing
liability to him as well.
1. The Toxic-Waste Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1983, at 20 (citing Dr. Samuel
Epstein).
2. See, e.g., id. at 20-23.
3. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at A16, col. 4 (EPA added 133 sites to the "national
priority list," bringing the total to 546. In the last two and a half years, since the
cleanup program began, only five sites had completed the cleanup).
II. THE THEORY: USING TRADITIONAL TORT THEORIES TO THEIR
POTENTIAL
When a waste generator disposes of his own wastes on his own
property, an injured victim has several tort theories available for use
in seeking recovery. 4 Once a viable theory is chosen (the theory se-
lected will vary between jurisdictions), it is still incumbent on the
plaintiff to prove causation 5 (and in some jurisdictions to overcome
statute of limitations problems6). If a plaintiff can carry his burden
of proof, a waste generator will generally be sufficiently capitalized
to provide adequate compensation. 7
A more formidable obstacle is encountered by the plaintiff who is
exposed to toxins which have leaked from an abandoned waste site,
from a waste dump operated by a significantly undercapitalized de-
positor, or from the negligence of other minimally solvent or insol-
vent middlemen involved in the transporting or depositing process.8
In these situations, simply obtaining a judgment against the most
proximate offender does little in providing redress to an injured
plaintiff. Many alternatives have been suggested as methods of im-
puting liability to the financially solvent generators of wastes in
these situations. However, the majority of those methods require
major revisions of traditional tort theories.9 Since, in most cases, a
plaintiff must ask a court to strain traditional theories of causation
(both scientific and proximate), 10 and perhaps the statute of limita-
tions,1 in order to reach a plaintiff's verdict, the court is in a much
better position to justify stretching in those areas if the underlying
theories of liability propounded by the plaintiff are as palatable to
the court as possible.
Of the several theories which have recently been proposed to im-
4. See infra notes 15-58 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
7. Note, Hazardous Waste Disposal: Is There Still a Role for Common Law?, 18
TULSA L.J. 448, 451 n.12 (1983) (the chemical industry is booming; worldwide chemical
sales for the top fifty producers reached approximately $90 billion in 1979).
8. Note, The Development of a Strict Liability Cause of Action for Personal Inju-
ries Resulting from Hazardous Waste, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 543, 548 n.29 (1981) [here-
inafter referred to as Strict Liability Cause of Action] (45.7 million tons of hazardous
waste have been disposed of off of generator's property over the last thirty years);
Note, Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensation for Contingencies Arising from
Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 33 S.C.L. REV. 543, 558
(1982) [hereinafter referred to as Hazardous Waste] (problems such as finding that the
parties who are primarily responsible for the dump site are minimally solvent, insol-
vent, or out of the jurisdiction are common to hazardous waste litigants).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prod-
ucts liability theory.
10. See infra notes 59-68, 110-19 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
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pute liability on generators of toxic wastes,1 2 the theory of vicarious
liability appears to be the most judicially acceptable in the present
legal climate.13 Of course, before the theory of vicarious liability is of
any value to a plaintiff, the liability of the intervening actor must be
established.14 In the field of toxic waste disposal, the intervening ac-
tor is the disposer of the waste.
III. LIABILITY OF THE ToxIc WASTE DEPOSITOR
Generally, there are four theories available upon which a deposi-
tor'5 of toxic wastes may be found liable for injuries to third parties.
The first, and best when available, is the theory of strict liability; the
second is nuisance; the third is negligence; and the fourth is statutory
(currently available in four states). A discussion of each follows.
A. Strict Liability
Rylande v. letcher 16 articulated the theory of strict liability for
landowners who injure others as a result of the "non-natural" use of
their property.17 Most states have adopted Rylands as a method of
allowing injured parties to recover damages in situations very similar
to those faced by the toxic waste plaintiff.18 Rylands is particularly
12. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text for discussion of the products li-
ability theory.
Attempts have been made to recover toxic waste damages under the tort theory of
trespass. Use of the trespass theory is limited to situations where the toxic material
physically invades a plaintiff's property and in so doing interferes with a possessory
interest in his land. Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?,
13 SETON HALL L. REV. 446, 461 (1983).
Some suggest the use of res ipsa loquitur by toxic injury plaintiffs. Comment, "Close
Encounters of the Toxic Kind"--Toward an Amelioration of the Substantive and Pro-
cedural Barriers for Latent Toxic Injury Plaintiffs, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 822, 836-41 (1981)
[hereinafter referred to as Comment, "Close Encounters of the Toxic Kind"]. This the-
ory would probably not prove suitable for most plaintiffs until medical science can dis-
tinguish between the illnesses and ailments caused by toxic waste exposure, and those
resulting from natural causes. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the difficulty in proving causation.
13. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
14. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 458 (4th ed. 1971).
15. Also applies to generators who dispose of their wastes on their own property.
16. 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868), affg 1 L.R.-Ex. ch. 265 (1866).
17. Id. Rylands involved the collapse of a reservoir which the defendants had
built over the plaintiff's mine shaft. The water in the reservoir flooded the mine and
thus damaged the plaintiff's property. The court held the defendants liable, without
proof of negligence; ruling that when a person uses his land for a non-natural purpose,
bringing a dangerous substance on it, and that substance escapes injuring another, the
defendant is strictly liable for the other's injury. Id.
18. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Haz-
well suited to meet the realities of contemporary toxic waste injuries.
Despite the state of New Jersey's repeated rejection of Rylands, a
case involving toxic waste exposure convinced the court that recogni-
tion and application of Rylands would be the most effective solution
to that state's growing toxic waste problem.19 In State Department of
Environmental Protection v. Ventron,20 the New Jersey court felt
the time had come to adopt Rylands, and in so doing, the court recog-
nized that "the law of liability has evolved so that a landowner is
strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic wastes that are
stored on his property and flow onto the property of others."2 1
The only obstacle involved in the application of Rylands to the
toxic waste scenario is meeting the "non-natural" use requirement.22
In some jurisdictions this means meeting the Restatement's "ultra-
hazardous activity" standard,23 while in others it could be the "abnor-
ardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 969-70 (1980). Rylands v. Fletcher has been ap-
proved by name, or by statement of principle founded upon it, in over thirty
jurisdictions. The number of states accepting the principle continues to increase at the
rate of approximately one state per year. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
549 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Wyoming still reject Rylands by name). California follows the Ry-
lands principle of strict liability based on the foundation of Green v. General Petro-
leum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928), and its progeny. Green involved an
explosion during the defendant's oil drilling operation. As a result of the explosion,
the plaintiff's property was injured. Although there was no negligence on the defend-
ant's part, the supreme court imposed absolute liability on the defendant. Id. at 331-33,
270 P. at 953-55.
19. See Department of Envtl. Protect. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 488, 468 A.2d
150, 157 (1983).
20. 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (toxic substances from defendant's forty-acre
waste dump, containing approximately 268 tons of toxic waste, seeped into and irre-
versibly toxified a state waterway).
21. The defendant was held strictly liable due to the "abnormally dangerous" na-
ture of the wastes. The court stated:
We believe it is time to recognize expressly that the law of liability has
evolved so that a landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by
toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto the property of
others. Therefore, we overrule Marshall v. Welwood and adopt the principle
of liability originally declared in Rylands v. Fletcher.
Id. at 488, 468 A.2d at 157. It was a toxic waste case, Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d
799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), which led a Florida court to conclude that "[t]he doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher should be applied in Florida." Id. at 801.
22. Note, supra note 18, at 970.
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) states:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose per-
son, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the
unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that
which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exer-
cised to prevent the harm.
While Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928), did not es-
tablish a specified standard for application of strict liability, it has been deemed to
have provided a standard for ultrahazardous activity. Thus, California courts normally
require plaintiffs to meet this standard. Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644, 295
P.2d 958, 961 (1956). Justice Carter, speaking for the court, declared "certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public generally, and of such rela-
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mally dangerous" test of the second Restatement. 2 4 One thing is
clear: regardless of the standard applied, if the dangers and risks as-
sociated with exposure to toxic waste materials are seriously consid-
ered by the court, it will find the adequate degr'ee of danger exists to
warrant strict liability.25
The policy behind strict liability is the belief that spreading the
costs of injuries among those who enjoy the benefits which result
from the dangerous use of property is preferable to imposing those
costs on the innocent victims who suffer because of it.26 Strict liabil-
ity simply involves determining who is better able to allocate the
costs, insure against the risks, and warn others about the dangers in-
volved in the hazardous activities, and then shifting the costs of the
activity to them.27 It has been suggested that the long range effect of
imposing strict liability on toxic waste dumpers would be the invest-
tive infrequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict liability as the best public
policy." Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 500, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (1948).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) stats:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
The factors which a court must consider to determine if a given activity is abnormally
dangerous are outlined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) as follows:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its danger-
ous attributes.
See generally supra note 14, at 509; Note, supra note 18, at 974-76.
25. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1308 (5th Cir.
1982) (court found the disposal of hazardous waste to be both abnormally dangerous
and ultrahazardous); Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (phosphate mining operation which contaminated public waters with more than
one billion gallons of phosphate slimes found to be both ultrahazardous and abnor-
mally dangerous); Department of Envtl. Protect. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468
A.2d 150 (1983) (mercury processing operation which polluted public waters with mer-
cury deemed abnormally dangerous) "[T]oxic wastes are 'abnormally dangerous,' and
the disposal of them, past or present, is an abnormally dangerous activity." Id. at 493,
468 A.2d at 160.
26. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 206, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982); Note, The Development of a Strict Liability Cause of Action for Personal Inju.
ries Resulting from Hazardous Waste, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 569 (1981).
27. " 'The justification for strict liability ... is that useful but dangerous activities
must pay their own way.'" Cities Serv. Co., 312 So. 2d at 803 (quoting 2 F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 14.4 (Supp. 1968)). See also Note, supra note 26, at 569-70.
ment of private funds into the development of more efficient and
safer disposal methods since improper disposal would no longer be
profitable.28
Although strict liability is not "absolute" liability,29 the "fault" de-
fenses of negligence are not available.30 If the conduct involved is de-
termined to be unreasonably dangerous, as is toxic waste disposal,
then strict liability applies without regard to what excuse the defend-
ant might have for not being aware of the danger,S1 and without ref-
erence to the many defenses available under other tort theories. 32
Also, a verdict in strict liability against a depositor would set up the
liability at the direct causation level which would allow the plaintiff
to seek recovery from the generators, whose waste the depositor was
storing.3 3 For these reasons, in those many jurisdictions where strict
liability is available, it is fairly clear that this is the most viable
method of suing toxic waste dumpers and setting up a claim against
the toxic waste generators.34
B. Nuisance
If the plaintiff happens to be a neighboring landowner to a toxic
waste disposal site, nuisance is nearly as effective as strict liability for
imposing liability on depositors of toxic wastes. Like strict liability,
"nuisance is predicated upon unreasonable injury rather than upon
unreasonable conduct."35 The theory of nuisance has been used effec-
28. See Note, supra note 18, at 968.
29. A defendant who is carrying on an ultrahazardous activity is only strictly lia-
ble for harm resulting from "that which makes the activity ultrahazardous." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977). See, e.g., Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash.
2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954) (defendant who operated blasting operations, an ul-
trahazardous activity because there is a danger of propelling rocks and debris onto ad-
joining property, was not strictly liable for interruptions to the plaintiff's mink
farming when the mink were disturbed by the blasting noises).
30. Clark v. Di Prima, 241 Cal. App. 2d 823, 827, 51 Cal. Rptr. 49, 51 (1966). See
also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (asbesto-
sis case). The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the "state-of-the-art" defense as it
is incompatible with strict liability. Despite the fact that the defendant may not have
known of danger involved in the activity, once the plaintiff established a strict liability
case, the defendant could not raise any "fault" type defenses. Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at
546.
31. For general discussion of strict liability and its defenses, see Keeton, Products
Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 408 (1970).
32. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. A common negligence defense is
that the industrial community lacked knowledge of risk and took reasonable precau-
tions to prevent the injury based on their existing knowledge. See, e.g., Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
33. See supra note 14.
34. E.g., Zazzali & Grad, supra note 12, at 461, 463; cf. Comment, Hazardous Waste
Liability and Compensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L.
REV. 307, 320 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Old Solutions]; Note, supra note 7, at
473.
35. Wood v. Picillo, - R.I. -, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (1982).
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tively in hazardous waste cases. In the case of Village of Wilsonville
v. SCA Services, Inc., 36 a group of plaintiffs brought a class action suit
and were awarded an injunction against a hazardous waste landfill
operator under a nuisance theory. Similarly, in Department of
Transportation v. PSC Resources, Inc., 37 a hazardous waste disposer
was sued under a nuisance theory and the court found that the dis-
charge or storage of hazardous wastes was a nuisance per se.
Therein, the court recognized that an activity as hazardous and dan-
gerous as that of storing toxic wastes must be treated as "a nuisance
at all times and under all circumstances regardless of location or sur-
roundings . . . [and] incurs absolute liability."38
The major difficulty in utilizing a nuisance theory to establish lia-
bility is that nuisance is dependent upon the plaintiff's ownership of
property. 39 Thus, a plaintiff who is injured but does not have a prop-
erty interest in a nearby property would be precluded from using the
nuisance theory of liability. This would bar nuisance actions by
school children who happen to be going to school on property infil-
trated by toxic substances; it would exclude employees whose work
premises were being invaded by hazardous substances;40 and it would
be a bar to a multitude of similar situations where the injured parties
were not the owners of the property where they were exposed.
Additionally, under a nuisance theory, courts may at times grant
permanent damages, but not abate the nuisance itself. This, in effect,
36. 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
37. 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (defendant
found liable for nearly five million dollars spent on cleanup for the dumping of waste
water containing oil, solids, soluble organic compounds, heavy metals, sodium hydrox-
ide, and sodium silicate into a state-owned lake).
38. Id. at 462, 419 A.2d at 1159.
39. The necessity of property ownership in nuisance cases was summarized as fol-
lows: "'The essence of a private nuisance is interference with the use and enjoyment
of land' and '. . . without it, the fact of personal injury, or other interference with
some purely personal right, is not enough for such a nuisance.'" Brown v. Petrolane
Inc., 102 Cal. App. 3d 720, 726, 162 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (11180) (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 611 n.91 (3d ed. 1964)); Culwell v. Abbott Constr.
Co., 211 Kan. 359, 362, 506 P.2d 1191, 1194 (1973); Comment, supra note 34, at 320;
Note, supra note 7, at 455.
Actions for public nuisance are ordinarily left to appointed representatives of the
community and may not be maintained by private individuals unless "the public nui-
sance is specially injurious to him." Brown, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
554; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3493 (West 1970).
40. Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food, Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
1953) (railroad employees were denied an injunction based on private or public nui-
sance to protect them from dangerous chemicals and gasses which were escaping from
a chemical manufacturing factory neighboring their workplace).
merely requires the defendant to pay a premium for a continuing
right to pollute.41
Thus, the nuisance theory has serious limitations as an effective
means of both imposing liability on waste depositors as well as abat-
ing the nuisance itself. However, if the plaintiff has an interest in
the affected property and the jurisdiction does not recognize a strict
liability claim, nuisance may be the best approach for suing a
depositor.
C. Negligence
Establishing a cause of action in negligence is, of course, much
more difficult than under a strict liability or nuisance theory. In neg-
ligence a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) that the defendant was
under a duty to conform to a standard of care; (2) that the defendant
breached that duty of care; and (3) that the defendant's conduct was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.42
As a result of the significant problems involved in proving a negli-
gence cause of action, some commentators consider this to be the
least effective method of establishing liability on the part of toxic
waste depositors.43 In order to establish the duty required to support
a cause of action in negligence the plaintiff is often required to prove
that the risk of the type of injury suffered was foreseeable to the de-
fendant at the time the alleged negligence occurred.44 The older the
deposit, the harder it is to prove foreseeability.
The difficulty of establishing a duty on the part of the defendant
has led some plaintiffs to rely on legislation, such as the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Labeling Act,45 in an attempt to claim negligence
per se based on the violation of a statute.46 However, since the bur-
den of proof in a negligence action is a heavy one, the plaintiff may
be best advised not to rely on a negligence theory in jurisdictions rec-
ognizing strict liability or where a nuisance cause of action is possible.
41. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (upon payment of one time "permanent" damages to neighboring
landowners who brought nuisance actions, defendant was allowed to continue cement
plant operations indefinitely, despite the fact that the plant still gave off dust and
noise beyond a level which neighbors could tolerate).
42. Zazzali & Grad, supra note 12, at 461; Note, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites: Coping with a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1720 (1980).
43. Note, supra note 42, at 1720.
44. Id. at 1720 n.79.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982).
46. See Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 223 Tenn. 428, 446 S.W.2d 515 (1969) (court indi-
cated in dictum that it would have been willing to find negligence per se based on vio-
lation of the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276
(1982), but, since plaintiff could not prove that had defendant followed the labeling re-
quirement he would not have been injured, the court let stand a lower court's dismis-
sal of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 439, 446 S.W.2d at 520).
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D. Statutory Liability
There are no federal statutes which expressly provide for a per-
sonal injury remedy for a plaintiff exposed to hazardous wastes.47
Four states have enacted legislation which is designed, at least in
part, to create a cause of action for individual plaintiffs. These states
are Oregon,48 Alaska,49 South Carolina,50 and New Jersey.51
The South Carolina and New Jersey statutes are similar to the fed-
eral "Superfund" legislation, in that they provide administrative
agencies with recourse against generators, transporters, and deposi-
tors of hazardous wastes, but they also attempt to provide hazardous
waste victims with compensation for their injuries through a fund
created by the statute.5 2 However, unlike the New Jersey statute,
the South Carolina statute requires that victims of "a closed permit-
ted" site attempt to recover judgments against any responsible par-
ties still in existence before they are able to avail themselves of the
state fund.53 Neither the South Carolina nor the New Jersey statutes
provide plaintiffs with additional causes of action against the genera-
tors, transporters, or disposers of hazardous wastes.5 4
In Oregon, if an individual can show that the person in control of
the toxic wastes violated the statute by unreasonably handling or dis-
47. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
(Superfund) Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), provides that polluters must
pay for damages to natural resources and are strictly liable for cleanup reimburse-
ment, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982), but provides no remedy for personal injury plaintiffs.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982), preserves an individual's right to sue under common law, but provides no relief
under its own provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1982). The Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976), likewise provides no compensatory right of
action to individual plaintiffs. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (amended as The Clear Water Act of 1977 (CWA), PUB. L.
No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977)), provides that the EPA can seek reimbursement of
cleanup costs from generators, transporters, and disposers, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1982),
but no private right of action is authorized. For an overview of federal statutes dealing
with this topic, see generally Zazzali & Grad, supra note 12, at 458-60.
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.685 (1983).
49. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-160 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g, h (1982).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(a) (1982) (fund for all direct and indirect dam-
ages, without regard to who sustained damages); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-160 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1983) ("fund for the purpose of mitigating any contingencies arising from the
operation of permitted land disposal facilities in this state"). See also Note, Hazardous
Waste, supra note 8, at 557.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-79.5c(2)(c)(iii) (Law. Co-op. 1982).
54. In fact, the New Jersey statute specifically limits recovery of damages to those
authorized by common or statutory law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(b) (1982).
posing of the waste, the defendant is deemed liable under the act.55
Also, under the Oregon statute, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden
of establishing a duty of care; however, he is still required to prove
breach of duty and causation.56
The Alaska statute goes even further than the Oregon statute in
providing that the polluter is strictly liable for personal injuries in-
curred by the victim. 57 Thus, if the victim is able to establish causa-
tion, there is no requirement under the Alaska law that he prove
that the discharge of the waste was negligently performed.5
8
IV. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF SCIENTIFIC CAUSATION: LINKING
THE EXPOSURE WITH THE INJURY
The problems associated with causation in the toxic waste arena
can create what is in fact a double-edged sword for toxic tort liti-
gants. The discrepancy which can occur due to the unique problems
of causation in this field are exemplified by two cases which are in
stark contrast to one another. The first is the much publicized situa-
tion involving the Love Canal victims.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, 1,431 residents of the Niagara
Falls, New York area brought claims against Occidental Petroleum
Corporation and other defendants for personal injuries. The resi-
dents suffered injuries which were claimed to have been the result of
exposure to toxic chemical residues dumped by the defendants. In
October of 1983, 1,345 of the original Love Canal claimants reportedly
settled their claims for no more than an average of $20,000 each. 59
That settlement was dramatically less than their original demands
which, for the group, totaled in excess of $16 billion and averaged
over $11 million each.6 0
In the Love Canal cases, there was no problem in proving the
existence of the hazardous waste, that the hazardous waste had es-
caped into the environment, or even in proving that the plaintiffs
were exposed to the waste. The difficulty was in scientifically prov-
ing that the illnesses and injuries suffered by the plaintiffs were
caused by exposure to the toxic waste and not by other sources or
causes.
61
55. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.685(1) (1983).
56. See Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 550.
57. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982).
58. Id. See also Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 550.
59. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1983, at 43. The direct liability of Occidental was
limited to $5 or $6 million in self-insurance costs. However, additional funds necessary
to meet the proposed settlement costs would be paid through insurance coverage. Id.
60. L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1983, § 1, at 1.
61. See New York Times, May 18, 1983, § 1, at 1. A government study conducted
by the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta and two other national laboratories con-
cluded that "no specific relationship existed between exposure to chemical agents in
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Contrast the dramatic decrease in worth of the New York Love Ca-
nal cases with the Lowe v. Norfolk and Western Railroad62 case de-
cided on August 5th, 1982 in Madison County, Illinois. In Lowe, the
group of plaintiffs were railroad workers who, at the time of trial, did
not show any objective symptoms of any illness or disease from expo-
sure to hazardous chemicals. The plaintiffs had been working on the
cleanup of a derailed tank car which may have contained up to one-
half of a teaspoon of tetrachlorodibenzodioxin, a toxic chemical. Soil
tests in the area did not disclose a trace of the chemical, however, the
possibility that the chemical may have been there could not be de-
nied. Because of the possibility that these plaintiffs could have been
exposed to toxic wastes which could result in serious injury or death
at some future date, the jury awarded the group a total of $58 million
in damages. 63
These cases provide us with graphic examples of how the causation
requirement, when dealing with a case involving latent injuries, can
destroy an otherwise substantial plaintiff's claim; while at the same
time, before a more receptive court, can provide an appealing argu-
ment to the jury about hidden prospective injuries which could occur
due to the plaintiff's exposure to hazardous substances. The Lowe
case is currently on appeal, and if the appellate courts in Illinois fol-
low the general rule of causation, the verdict will be overruled. The
general rule of causation is that the mere possibility that the defend-
ant caused or will cause injury to the plaintiff is not sufficient proof
to impose liability.6 4
The Lowe case is valuable to help us recognize the difficulties in-
volved in proving causation when the injuries which a plaintiff suf-
fers take years to fully manifest themselves. The toxic tort plaintiff
is faced with the dilemma of either suing at the first sign of the
slightest injury or, as was the case in Lowe, before injury has mani-
fested itself. If the plaintiff chooses the latter course, he faces not be-
ing able to prove the entire extent of his damages. However, by
waiting until the injury fully develops, the plaintiff risks the possibil-
the Love Canal area and increased frequency of chromosome damage." Id. Other gov-
ernmental studies have indicated "no firm evidence of increased disease incidence or
mortality" in the area. Id.
62. Am. Law., Apr. 1983, at 88, col. 1, rev'd on other grounds, 124 Ill. App. 3d 80,
463 N.E.2d 792 (1984).
63. Id.
64. Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort
Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 821-26 (1982-83); Comment, "Close En-
counters of the Toxic Kind, " supra note 12, at 848.
ity that the defendant will no longer be available or financially
viable.
Clearly, there are evidentiary problems in linking the plaintiffs' in-
juries in these cases to the toxic exposure itself.65 As one medical au-
thority has noted: "[t]here is not a classic set of symptoms for
chemical diseases." 66 Sometimes the symptoms of lengthy or re-
peated exposure to small amounts of toxic wastes are very difficult to
trace, in that they may resemble the natural aging process or com-
mon diseases.67 But, whatever the effect, generally the symptoms do
not appear until several years after the initial exposure. 68
V. THE APPLICATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN TOXIC
INJURY CASES
When the problems of proving scientific causation are combined
with strict enforcement of the statute of limitations, the dilemma fac-
ing plaintiffs is multiplied.
Although many states have adopted some type of a discovery rule69
as to when the statute of limitations commences in cases of latent in-
jury, there are several states which commence the running of the
statute of limitations at the time of injury.7 0 The United States
Supreme Court recognized the unfairness involved in imposing a
65. See generally Comment, "Close Encounters of the Toxic Kind, " supra note 12,
at 848.
66. TIME, The Toxicity Connection, Sept. 22, 1980, at 63 (quoting Dr. Irving Se-
likoff, Mt. Sinai Medical Center).
67. Perham, Legacy of Poisons, EPA J., vol. 4 n.5, July-Aug. 1979, at 4. Dioxin ex-
posure can cause chloracne in the skin, but so can allergies to certain plants. Diseases
like leukemia and bone cancer can be caused by ingestion of the radium and radon
dust produced during uranium mine operations, or they may also be caused by benzene
exposure. TIME, supra note 66, at 63. See also H. CALDICOrr, NUCLEAR MADNESS 11-39
(1978).
68. Note, supra note 26, at 550; Note, Denial of a Remedy: Former Residents of
Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L.
161 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Denial of a Remedy]. "There is a twenty- to thirty-year
latency period between the initial exposure to a carcinogen and the appearance of most
types of cancer." Id. at 163.
69. The discovery rule is simply that the cause of action does not accrue, and thus,
the statute of limitations does not commence to run "until the plaintiff knows or
should reasonably know of the causal connection between his injury and the defend-
ant's wrongdoing .. " Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 169, 371 A.2d 170,
173 (1977) (citing Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973)).
California is typical of many states in that it has judicially adopted the discovery rule
in most cases where "the pathological effect occurs without perceptible trauma and the
victim is 'blamelessly ignorant' of the cause of injury. ... Pereira v. Dow Chem. Co.,
129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 873-74, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369 (1982) (quoting Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975)) (plaintiff had
come in contact with DER 599, a toxic substance, at work and twenty months later
discovered the possible connection to his kidney damage).
70. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446
N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982) (for asbesto-
sis, the statute runs from date of last exposure). For a discussion detailing the statute
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strict application of the statute of limitations to cases involving latent
injuries in the case of Urie v. Thompson.71 That case involved a
claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (which had a three-
year statute of limitations).72
In Urie, the claimant had been exposed to silicon dioxide dust for
about thirty years. He eventually developed silicosis from the expo-
sure. Urie's employer argued that either: (1) the silicosis must have
been contracted during the first twenty-eight years of exposure and
thus the three-year statute of limitations barred his recovery; or, (2)
that each breath of silicon dioxide dust was a separate injury and
thus Urie could only claim damages for injuries caused by the past
two years' exposure and not the prior twenty-eight.7 3
The Court rejected the first argument, holding that if Urie was
barred by the statute of limitations from bringing a claim for an in-
jury which was inherently unknowable, then the federal remedy
would be delusive and the intent of Congress to provide a remedy
would be foiled.74 The defendant's second argument, that a separate
cause of action existed with each exposure, was similarly rejected.
The Court held that such an approach would produce consequences
which could not be reconciled with the traditional purpose of statutes
of limitations;7 5 such an application of the statute would work to
limit the claimant's damages to those which could be proven to have
been caused only by the most recent exposure. Such construction
would also wholly bar a claimant from suit if he had left employment
over three years ago or had been transferred to a position where he
was no longer exposed to the chemical over three years before the
disease appeared.76
Several states which do not normally apply the discovery rule have
adopted it in cases of exposure to products and substances which
cause latent effects similar to toxic wastes.77 The policy behind the
of limitations problems faced by New York plaintiffs, see Denial of a Remedy, supra
note 68.
71. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
72. Id. at 168.
73. Id. at 169 (plaintiff filed the action one year after ceasing to work for the
defendant).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 170. The traditional purposes were said to "require the assertion of
claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights." Id.
(emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. E.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.
1979); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978); Raymond
imposition of a statute of limitations is to prevent plaintiffs from rest-
ing on their claims and to better insure just and reliable verdicts
rather than ones based on lost records and faded memories.78 In
toxic waste exposure cases, as in all latent injury cases, the discovery
rule does more to advance that policy than does a strict application of
the statute. The plaintiffs cannot be said to be resting on their claims
when they are not yet aware of the existence of a claim. So far as
just and reliable verdicts are concerned, if a plaintiff is forced to sue
before his injury has developed, either his case will be dismissed due
to lack of injury, or the jury will be forced to speculate as to the ex-
tent of his damages (as was illustrated by Lowe 79).
Where the realities of latent injury conflict with strict application
of the statute of limitations, they combine to deny victims of hazard-
ous waste injuries access to the courts. In such cases, the plaintiffs
are in effect being denied their rights to due process of law. The
Supreme Court has held that the "right of action to recover damages
for an injury is property" is not to be legislatively destroyed.8 0 In ad-
dition, the Court has found that the Constitution requires "free ac-
cess to [the courts] for a length of time reasonably sufficient to
enable an ordinary diligent man to institute proceedings for [the pro-
tection of his rights]."8 1
Thus, it follows that the states cannot avoid unconstitutional re-
sults in latent injury cases without a discovery rule. The trend has
been to simply extend the date from which the statute of limitations
begins to run until the plaintiff's injuries have manifested themselves
and the plaintiff is reasonably aware of the causal connection be-
tween those injuries and the defendant's actions.8 2 If justice is to be
served, this trend must continue until all states have adopted a dis-
covery rule.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Ander-
son, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), affd and rev'd in part, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1975).
78. Denial of a Remedy, supra note 68, at 166.
79. Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Am. Law., Apr. 1983, at 88, col. 1; Strickland v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1978). "It would be unreasonable to
dismiss the plaintiff's suit because there was no injury and then not allow him to bring
the suit years later when asbestosis develops on the ground that the claim is barred by
the statute of limitations." Id. at 217.
It should also be noted that this causation problem undoubtedly will be reduced as
medical science develops in the toxic disease area. See Comment, Personal Injury Haz-
ardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 797,
830 (1982-83).
80. Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 19
(1893).
81. Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920).
82. Old Solutions, supra note 34, at 321.
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VI. IMPUTING LIABILITY ON THE GENERATOR OF THE WASTE
Establishment of liability against the depositor still does not guar-
antee that a plaintiff will be adequately compensated.8 3 Because the
generator of waste will often be stronger financially than the waste
depositor, the plaintiff will want to name him as a defendant as well.
Under a theory of imputed liability, a recovery from the generator
gives the plaintiff his best chance of an adequate award.84 Some have
suggested other methods to impute liability such as by-products lia-
bility, but methods such as this require a very liberal court and sig-
nificant modification to be viable alternatives. The most practical
theory of imputed liability is that of vicarious liability.
A. Vicarious Liability: Overcoming the Independent
Contractor Rule
Under a vicarious liability theory, the plaintiff is best able to de-
fend against the independent contractor rule,a5 which shields the
generator from liability for the negligent acts of the independent
transporters and depositors of toxic wastes.86 The principle exception
to the independent contractor rule deals with demonstrating that the
activities which the independent contractor is hired to perform are
inherently dangerous. 87
Surprisingly, the most serious difficulty facing plaintiffs appears to
be convincing the court that hazardous waste disposal is inherently
dangerous. A case on point is Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc.88 In that
case the depositor had a very small waste disposal operation. A leak
developed in the disposal system which resulted in injury to the
plaintiff. The court recognized the inherently dangerous activity ex-
ception to the independent contractor rule, but refused to classify
83. See Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
84. Id.
85. The independent contractor rule, simply stated, is that an employer of an in-
dependent contractor, unless he is himself negligent, is not vicariously liable for the
torts of the contractor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 (1965). See, e.g.,
Risley v. Lenwell, 129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 622, 277 P.2d 897, 907 (1955); Ewell v. Petro
Processors of La., Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 575
(La. 1979).
86. See Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 561-62.
87. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Chesapeake Util. Corp., 436 A.2d
314, 326-27 (Del. 1981); A.M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Western Mortgage & Warranty
Title Co., 51 Mont. 94, 99, 149 P. 489, 490 (1915); Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc.,
364 So. 2d at 606; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965).
88. 364 So. 2d 604 (1978), writ denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (1979).
toxic waste disposal as inherently dangerous.8 9 The court took the
view that if the work is such that any precaution could render it safe,
the employer could be held liable only if he authorized, expressly or
impliedly, the particular unsafe manner in which the work was
performed.90
The Ewell court is in stark contrast with most other authorities
that classify certain activities as inherently dangerous without refer-
ence to precautions that would render the activity "safe." 91 The
Ewell ruling places the burden on a plaintiff seeking to impose liabil-
ity on an employer for a contractor's actions of showing that no
method existed by which the activity could have been rendered to-
tally safe. Where the scientific information on the hazard and the
available means of eliminating it varies, the plaintiff may often find
this burden insurmountable. 92
The majority of cases and the Restatement would clearly deem
toxic waste disposal to be inherently dangerous. The majority view
deems an activity to be inherently dangerous if the activity cannot be
carried out safely absent the taking of special precautions or care. 93
The Missouri Supreme Court described the rule as follows:
"(I]f the doing of the work necessarily causes dangers which must be guarded
against, then the employer must see to it that such dangers are guarded
against, and cannot relieve himself by casting this duty on an independent
contractor. If, however, the work is dangerous only by reason of negligence in
doing it, then the liability falls only on the independent contractor. In the one
89. Id. at 607.
90. Id. at 606.
91. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. See, e.g., LaCount v. Hensel
Phelps Constr. Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 754, 145 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1978) (found that trial court
was justified in holding employer liable for the actions of an independent contractor
due to the inherently dangerous nature of a job involving the operation of a crane to
lift girders and ballasts weighing from eight to one hundred tons); Smith v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 3d 826, 132 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1976) (store would be liable for
independent contractor's actions if the sign being lowered by independent contractor
above the store's entrance fell in the process of being lowered due to the inherent dan-
ger involved in such a project).
92. While some courts have found working with highly flammable substances and
coal mining not to be inherently dangerous, others have found such activities as high-
way construction and painting above a sidewalk to be inherently dangerous. Note,
supra note 8, at 563.
93. Despite its expression in terms of "inherent" danger, "[iut is not ... nec-
essary to the employer's liability that the work be of a kind which cannot be
done without a risk of harm to others .... " Indeed, application of the rule is
predicated on the negligent failure of either the employer or the contractor to
take appropriate special precautions.
Henderson Bros. Stores v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 913, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 880
(1981) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427, comment b). An inherently
dangerous activity is one "which can be carried on safely only by the exercise of spe-
cial skill and care, and which involves grave risk of danger to persons or property if
negligently done." Majestic Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Toto Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425,
435, 153 A.2d 321, 326 (1959).
For a survey of activities deemed to be inherently dangerous by California courts,
see Henderson Bros. Stores, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 911 n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 878 n.3.
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case the doing of the work creates danger and requires active care to counter-
act the danger. In the other there is no danger unless created by negligence.
The one starts with danger and requires preventive care to make safety, while
the other starts with safety and requires negligence to make danger."
9 4
The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that an activity may be
inherently dangerous without "the work being of a kind which can-
not be done without a risk of harm to others. . .. .95
Hazardous waste disposal clearly meets the requirements under
the majority's definition as well as under the Restatement's ap-
proach. Presumably, the disposal of toxic substances meets even the
extreme test suggested by the Ewell court. It can be argued that
toxic waste simply cannot be disposed of without a "high degree of
risk to persons and property which cannot be totally eliminated by
reasonable care." 96 A large part of that risk is based upon the nature
of many of the waste products themselves. For example, toxic heavy
metals will not degrade, and the EPA has seriously questioned
whether even our most advanced designs in waste disposal can be
maintained and safely operated for long periods of time.97
In the end, the question of whether or not to impute vicarious lia-
bility on the generators comes down to a question of public policy.
As the Michigan Supreme Court put it, "where to draw the line be-
tween so-called 'delegable' and 'nondelegable' tasks and duties be-
comes a question of policy." 9 8  The court indicated that in
determining tort policy it was obligated to consider both "compensa-
tion to victims" as well as the encouragement of "the implementation
of reasonable safeguards against risks of [future] injury."99 The deci-
sion of whether to impose vicarious liability must also consider the
high potential for harm to public health and safety if improvement in
94. Smith v. Inter-County Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 518, 522 (1977) (quoting Carson v.
Blodgett Constr. Co., 189 Mo. App. 120, 126, 174 S.W. 447, 448 (1915)).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 comment b (1965). The text of § 427
reads as follows:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be in-
herent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to
contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable pre-
cautions against such danger.
96. Note, supra note 26, at 565-66. See also Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8,
at 563.
97. See Note, Hazardous Waste Disposal: Is There Still a Role for Common Law,
18 TULSA L.J. 448, 460 n.63 (1983).
98. Funk v. General Motors Corp., 392 Mich. 91, 101, 220 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1974).
99. Id. at 104, 220 N.W.2d at 646.
safeguards are not encouraged.100 Finally, since the primary benefici-
ary of waste disposal is the generator, and since the generator is in
the best position to distribute the costs of proper waste disposal, it is
only appropriate that he, rather than innocent victims, should pay
the costs when the waste is not properly disposed of.101
B. By-Products Liability: The Theory of the Future?
Although a strict products liability approach to toxic waste has yet
to be accepted as a valid theory for imputing liability to generators of
toxic by-products, it has been suggested that, with some modification,
it could be a very viable solution to many of a plaintiff's problems.102
The policies underlying products liability are quite obviously appli-
cable to hazardous waste exposure injuries: (1) the individual victim
is generally in no position to bear the costs of the injury, while the
manufacturer can spread the loss to the customers who benefit from
the process; and (2) the party who introduced the risk into society
should be the one to bear its costs.' 0 3 If a products liability type of
action could be brought by waste exposure victims, perhaps called
"by-products liability," it would be a very useful tool for insuring that
the victim would have a direct action for recourse against the genera-
tor. Despite any claims by a generator concerning independent con-
tractor shields, or lack of control over the by-product after it leaves
their property, a generator would be liable for the injuries caused by
the by-product so long as the use to which it was being put was fore-
seeable. 104 Foreseeability even includes the possible misuse of the
productl05
Indeed, a by-products liability theory would provide plaintiffs with
a very effective tool for imputing liability to the generators of toxic
waste. As products liability law currently exists, however, several
modifications would be required in order to establish a functional
"by-products liability" theory.
First, products liability deals with special liabilities between "sell-
100. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Grady Dev. Corp., 37 Md. App. 303,
319, 377 A.2d 557, 565 (1977).
101. Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 562.
102. Note, supra note 18, at 980-83.
103. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205-06, 447 A.2d 539, 547
(1982); Note, supra note 18, at 983; Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 568.
104. Hall v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. N.Y. 1972), affd
sub nom. Ball v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975) (children
were injured by blasting caps manufactured by the defendant). The defendant was
held liable under a products liability theory for the injuries to the plaintiffs despite the
claim that a third party gave the children the blasting caps and the products were not
properly used. The court found that it was foreseeable that children could get the caps
and that the caps might be used improperly, resulting in the type of injury the plain-
tiffs suffered. Id. at 361-66.
105. Id. at 363.
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ers" and "users or consumers." 06 The generator of toxic waste does
not "sell" the waste, nor does the victim truly qualify as a "user" or
"consumer." Despite these difficulties in characterizing the parties,
the scope of products liability has recently been moving away from a
strict application of these labels in some areas. For example, many
jurisdictions are redefining the terms "user" and "consumer" to in-
clude mere bystanders injured by another's use of the product.107
Likewise, applying the classification of seller to the generator of the
dangerous by-products would not run entirely counter to the prod-
ucts liability theory, since a generator does recognize economic gain
from his activities when the finished product is sold.108
Finally, in order to establish a claim in products liability, the prod-
uct must be defective either in design, manufacture, or warning.109
The failure of a generator to adequately warn of the dangers of im-
proper disposal of the waste and failure to monitor that disposal may
be sufficient to meet this test, but modification is nonetheless
required.
Quite clearly, the adoption of a by-products liability cause of action
requires a court to do some re-thinking of the products liability law
and tailor it to the toxic waste situation. Because serious problems
exist in more vital areas of a plaintiff's case, it may be too much to
ask a court to make the required changes at this point.
VII. THE BATTLE OF OWNERSHIP: TYING THE GENERATOR
TO HIS WASTE
The final major hurdle to recovery from the generator of toxic
waste is proving that the plaintiff was exposed to waste which that
particular defendant generated.110 Where there is only one generator
depositing waste in the dump to which the plaintiff was exposed
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
107. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 662-63. E.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,
70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (bystander was killed when defec-
tive drive shaft caused a driver to lose control of her automobile and crash into a by-
stander's vehicle). The court held:
The public policy which protects the driver and passenger of the car should
also protect the bystander, and where a driver or passenger of another car is
injured due to defects in the manufacture of the automobile and without any
fault of their own, they may recover from the manufacturer of the defective
automobile.
Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
108. Note, supra note 18, at 979.
109. Id.
110. Old Solutions, supra note 34, at 322-25.
there is no causation problem; but, where several generators have de-
posited at the dump site, or where there are no records available to
tell which toxic waste generator dumped there, the plaintiff faces a
very difficult hurdle indeed.
In the situation where several generators deposit at the site, if the
plaintiff can establish that any of them contributed to his injury he
can recover the entire amount of his damages from any of those con-
tributors under principles of joint and several liability.111 Of course,
those defendants who paid for the plaintiff's damages would gener-
ally have a cause of action for contribution or indemnity by any of
the other defendant generators also held liable.112
The most serious problem exists in situations where none of the
waste generators can be identified. The only remedy available to
plaintiffs under these circumstances is to seek the joint liability ap-
plied by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries.113 In Sindell, the plaintiff brought a products liability suit
against eleven major drug manufacturers for injuries which she suf-
fered as a result of her mother's taking the drug DES during her
pregnancy. Although she could not prove which of the more than
two hundred DES manufacturers actually produced the particular
drug her mother took, she did prove that the eleven defendants in
court had produced at least ninety percent of the DES on the market
at the time of her mother's consumption of the drug. Although the
court recognized the general rule of causation which requires a plain-
tiff to identify the defendant which caused the harm,114 it noted that
"[o]nce the plaintiff has met her burden of joining the required de-
fendants," representing a "substantial share" of the market, the de-
fendants are in a better position to prove that they could not have
produced the drug taken by the plaintiff's mother than the plaintiff
111. E.g., Department of Envtl. Protect. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 502-03, 468
A.2d 150, 165-66 (1983) (joint and several liability for cleanup and removal of toxic
waste); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976) (chemicals were
emitted into the air and deposited onto the plaintiff's property from a group of nearby
chemical manufacturers; court found that, since the injury could not be apportioned
with reasonable certainty as to any of the' individual manufacturers, all of the wrong-
doers were jointly and severally liable for the entire damages and the injured party
could proceed for judgment against any one of the wrongdoers separately); Landers v.
East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952) (oil companies
which used a pipeline to carry salt water and oil to their operations let more than
10,000 barrels escape into the plaintiff's fresh water fish pond; court held that the
wrong could not be apportioned and thus all wrongdoers were jointly and severally lia-
ble for the entire amount of the damages and the plaintiff could proceed to judgment
against any one of them separately or against all of them together).
112. See, e.g., Note, Joint and Several Liability under Superfund, 13 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 489, 514-15 (1982).
113. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
114. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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is to prove that they did.115 The court concluded that "as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury."116 Because "the manufacturers of a substan-
tial share of the DES which her mother might have taken" were
named in the action, each defendant would be "held liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market
unless it demonstrated that it could not have made the product which
caused the plaintiff's injuries."1 7
Thus, under this theory of "market share" joint liability, a toxic
waste exposure victim might also be able to recover in situations
where the specific generators are unknown if he can isolate the gen-
erators who produce a "substantial share" of the type of waste by
which he was injured.118 Once identified, each waste generator
would similarly need to exonerate himself or be found liable for the
same proportion of the plaintiff's damages as its share of the waste
represents its share of the market.
Although the "market share" theory of joint liability has received
a mixed welcome in other jurisdictions, 1 19 it is certainly as applicable
in toxic waste exposure cases as it is in products liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The most significant obstacles to a toxic waste victim's recovery are
proving scientific causation, overcoming the independent contractor
rule, and in many cases proving that the generator(s) named as de-
fendants produced the waste which injured the plaintiff. If an ac-
cepted theory of liability is proven against the disposer of the waste,
and the theory of vicarious liability is used in penetrating the in-
115. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
116. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
117. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
118. Note, Hazardous Waste, supra note 8, at 571-74.
119. E.g., Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (causation can-
not be established on a theory of market share liability); Starling v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (recognition of market share liability theory
would result in an unprecedented departure from traditional Georgia tort law); Prelick
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (the identity of at least one
defendant who actually caused the injury precludes the use of market share liability,
therefore the question of whether Pennsylvania would accept the theory has not yet
been reached); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981) (market share
liability is contrary to public policy of South Carolina).
dependent contractor shield, then a court is in the best possible posi-
tion to meet causation challenges with appropriate flexibility.
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